EPA and Administrative Inspections by Martin,, Robert W., Jr.
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 7 | Issue 1 Article 3
Winter 1979
EPA and Administrative Inspections
Robert W. Martin, Jr.
Florida State University College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert W. Martin, Jr., EPA and Administrative Inspections, 7 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 123 (2017) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol7/iss1/3
EPA AND ADMINISTRATIVE INSPECTIONS
ROBERT W. MARTIN, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) is not the only federal agency that engages in administra-
tive inspections as part of its enforcement program, it was in the
context of an OSHA inspection that the United States Supreme
Court most recently considered the question of the validity of war-
rantless administrative inspections. The Court held in Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc.' that the fourth amendment required OSHA to obtain
a search warrant for routine nonconsensual inspections. Therefore,
section 8(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 was
held unconstitutional insofar as it purported "to authorize inspec-
tions without [a] warrant or its equivalent . . . ."I The Court did
not go so far as to say that there would be a necessity of showing
"probable cause in the criminal law sense" before OSHA could
obtain a search warrant.4 Rather, the Court indicated that probable
cause could be based upon "specific evidence of an existing viola-
tion" as well as upon a showing that " 'reasonable legislative or
administrative standards for conducting an . inspection are sat-
isfied . . . ." "
While the Court in Barlow's, Inc. specifically limited its opinion
* Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. B.A. 1973, Hamilton
College; J.D. 1976, Rutgers Law School. Former Assistant Regional Counsel, United States
Environmental Protection Agency.
1. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1970). This section provides:
In order to carry out the purposes of this chapter, the Secretary [of Labor], upon
presenting appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in charge, is
authorized-
(1) to enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory, plant, establish-
ment, construction site, or other area, workplace or environment where work is
performed by an employee of an employer; and
(2) to inspect and investigate during regular working hours and at other reason-
able times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, any such
place of employment and all pertinent conditions, structures, machines, apparatus,
devices, equipment, and materials therein, and to question privately any such
employer, owner, operator, agent, or employee.
3. 436 U.S. at 325.
4. Id. at 320.
5. Id. A recent OSHA inspection case decided after Barlow's, Inc., however, indicates that
the courts may not be following the diluted probable cause guideline set in Barlow's, Inc. See
Marshall v. Weyerhouser Co., 47 U.S.L.W. 2183 (D.N.J. Sept. 7, 1978). The Supreme Court
may have to offer further guidelines as lower courts try to avoid becoming rubber stamps in
the administrative search warrant process.
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to the facts and law concerned with OSHA,' this article will examine
the implications of that decision upon administrative inspections
conducted pursuant to various regulatory statutes administered by
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). To date, there has not
been a reported judicial decision concerning a challenge to a war-
rantless inspection conducted by EPA.7
I. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE
INSPECTIONS
Although the line of Supreme Court decisions on the issue of the
validity of warrantless administrative inspections is relatively short,
it can be most confusing. Part of the confusion results from a basic
dilemma. The Court has attempted to maintain equilibrium be-
tween the need for periodic inspections by various administrative
agencies and the constraints imposed by the history and language
of the fourth amendment!
In Frank v. Maryland, I the Court first determined the legality of
warrantless administrative inspections. 1" There, in response to a
resident's complaint that she had rats in her cellar, a city health
inspector began an inspection of the houses in the vicinity of the
complainant's house. The inspector approached Frank's home and,
after getting no response to his knocks, "proceeded to inspect the
6. 436 U.S. at 321-22.
7. Recently, however, Dow Chemical Co. filed a suit against the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (Dow Chemical Co. v. Costle, No. 78-10044 (E.D. Mich., filed April 11, 1978))
alleging, inter alia, a violation of Dow's fourth amendment rights. "The complaint asks the
court to declare that EPA's conduct in photographing its facilities constituted an unreasona-
ble search and seizure and deprived the company of its right to privacy in violation of the
Fourth Amendment." 46 U.S.L.W. 2533 (E.D. Mich. April 11, 1978). See also note 50 infra.
8. In Barlow's, Inc. the Court stated:
The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment protects commercial buildings as'
well as private homes. To hold otherwise would belie the origin of that Amendment,
and the American colonial experience. . . .The general warrant was a recurring
point of contention in the colonies immediately preceding the Revolution. The
particular offensiveness it engendered was acutely felt by the merchants and busi-
nessmen whose premises and products were inspected for compliance with the
several parliamentary revenue measures that most irritated the colonists [citing
the Stamp Act of 1765, the Townsend Revenue Act of 1767 and the tea tax of 1773
as notable examples].
436 U.S. at 311 (citing 0. M. DICKERSON, Writs of Assistance as a Cause of the Revolution,
in THE ERA OF THE AMERICAN REvOLUTION 40 (R. Morris, ed. 1939)).
9. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
10. There were two other cases that the Supreme Court had decided earlier that arguably
could be classified as administrative inspection cases. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
However, Frank v. Maryland was the "Supreme Court's first attempt to define the restric-
tions applicable to administrative searches." See also Note, Administrative Search Warrants,
58 MINN. L. REv. 607, 611 (1974); 22 ViL. L. REv. 1214, 1216 (1977).
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area outside the house."" The inspector found the house to be in an
"extreme'state of decay," and discovered approximately a half ton
of waste in the backyard." Frank refused to allow the inspector to
enter his house and was subsequently found guilty of violating the
city code for refusing entry to a health inspector who under the
standards of the Baltimore City Code, had "cause to suspect a nuis-
ance" existed in the house. 13 Frank appealed to the United States
Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the city code
that purported to allow warrantless inspections. As in Barlow's, Inc.
the Court reviewed the history of the fourth amendment but, unlike
Barlow's, Inc., concluded that the fourth amendment was not appl-
icable because "[n]o evidence for criminal prosecution [was]
sought to be seized."1 Therefore, the Court held that no warrant
was required. It was in this context that the Supreme Court first
spoke of the need to distinguish administrative inspections from
criminal searches:
That there is "a total unlikeness" between "official acts and pro-
ceedings," for which the legal protection of privacy requires a
search warrant . . . and the situation now under consideration is
laid bare by the suggestion that the kind of an inspection by a
health official with which we are concerned may be satisfied by
what is, in effect, a synthetic search warrant, an authorization "for
periodic inspections.""
Thus the Court in Frank, having recognized an ongoing public
need for administrative inspections, apparently felt that imposing
a search warrant requirement would frustrate such inspections since
the concomitant requirement of a showing of probable cause was
then assumed to be inflexible. The Court altered its rigid approach
in Camara v. Municipal Court," however, and held that while a
warrant was required to conduct an administrative inspection, it
could be obtained upon less than a showing of probable cause in the
criminal law sense.' 7
11. 359 U.S. at 361.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 366.
15. Id. at 372-73 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624 (1886)) (other citations
omitted).
16. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
17. Id. at 534, 538. This notion of a diluted probable cause requirement finds no support
in the language of the fourth amendment.
The dissent in Barlow's, Inc. could be said to prefer an adoption of the analysis of Frank
v. Maryland absent the civil-criminal distinction:
Since the general warrant, not the warrantless search, was the immediate evil at
19791
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In Camara the appellant had refused to allow a warrantless
inspection of his apartment by city housing inspectors who had
entered the apartment building "to make a routine annual inspec-
tion."1' 8 The Court recognized the compelling public need for admin-
istrative inspections, but refused to totally disregard fourth amend-
ment protections:
[Tihe reasons put forth in Frank v. Maryland and in other cases
for upholding these warrantless searches are insufficient to justify
so substantial a weakening of the Fourth Amendment's protections
.... The Frank majority gave recognition to the unique charac-
ter of these inspection programs by refusing to require search war-
rants; to reject that disposition does not justify ignoring the ques-
tion whether some other accommodation between public need and
individual rights is essential."
The "other accommodation" that the Carnara court chose was to
eliminate the traditional showing of probable cause typically re-
quired for a search warrant. While the Frank Court had focused on
the "reasonableness" of administrative inspections to dispense with
the warrant requirement completely, the Camara Court, in the con-
text of an area search, held that this same "reasonableness" justi-
fied only a less stringent probable cause requirement. The Court in
Camara reasoned that:
[E]xcept in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of
private property without proper consent is "unreasonable" unless
it has been authorized by a valid search warrant ...
But reasonableness is still the ultimate standard. If a valid
public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is
probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant. Such
which the Fourth Amendment was directed, it is not surprising that the Framers
placed precise limits on its issuance. The requirement that a warrant only issue on
a showing of particularized probable cause was the means adopted to circumscribe
the warrant power. While the subsequent course of Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence in this Court emphasizes the dangers posed by warrantless searches con-
ducted without probable cause, it is the general reasonableness standard in the
first Clause, not the Warrant Clause, that the Framers adopted to limit this cate-
gory of searches. It is, of course, true that the existence of a valid warrant normally
satisfies the reasonableness requirement under the Fourth Amendment. But we
should not dilute the requirements of the Warrant Clause in an effort to force every
kind of governmental intrusion which satisfies the Fourth Amendment definition
of a "search" into a judicially developed, warrant-preference scheme.
436 U.S. at 328.
18. 387 U.S. at 526.
19. Id. at 534.
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an approach neither endangers time-honored doctrines applicable
to criminal investigations nor makes a nullity of the probable cause
requirement in this area. It merely gives full recognition to the
competing public and private interests here at stake and, in so
doing, best fulfills the historic purpose behind the constitutional
right to be free from unreasonable government intrusions of
privacy. 0
In a companion case, See v. City of Seattle,' the Court extended
its holding in Camara to include administrative inspections of com-
mercial premises. Although the Camara Court recognized that con-
sent and emergency situations were exempt from the warrant re-
quirement, those were the only two exceptions mentioned by the
Court." Since Camara, however, the Court has gone on to recognize
other exceptions to the warrant requirement in the context of ad-
ministrative inspections.
This is an unfortunate development, since the Camara doctrine
of "flexible cause" could have provided a sensitive accommodation
to the competing interests involved. A lesser probable cause stan-
dard for administrative search warrants as authorized by Camara
would obviate the necessity for new exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement. There would remain only the exceptions that existed
20. Id. at 528-29, 539 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). A "synthetic search warrant"
argument similar to that in Frank was made by Justice Stevens in dissent in Barlow's, Inc.
There he said:
Fidelity to the original understanding of the Fourth Amendment, therefore, leads
to the conclusion that the Warrant Clause has no application to routine, regulatory
inspections of commercial premises. If such [administative] inspections are valid,
it is because they comport with the ultimate reasonableness standard of the Fourth
Amendment. If the Court were correct in its view that such inspections, if under-
taken without a warrant, are unreasonable in the constitutional sense, the issuance
of a "new fangled warrant"-to use Mr. Justice Clark's characteristically expressive
term-without any true showing of particularized probable cause would not be
sufficient to validate them.
436 U.S. at 328 (footnote omitted).
21. 387 U.S. 541 (1967). It has also become clear that what the Court said in Camara
concerning the requirement of a search warrant does not extend only to "area searches." See,
e.g., Air Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974). An area
search "is the search of an entire municipal area ... based upon legislative or administrative
assessment of broad factors such as the area's age or condition." 387 U.S. at 532.
22. 387 U.S. at 539. Although not mentioned as an exception to the warrant requirement,
the Camara Court did state: "in the case of routine area inspections,. .. it seems likely that
warrants should normally be sought only after entry is refused unless there has been a citizen
complaint or there is other satisfactory reason for securing immediate entry." Id. at 539-40.
Even if such a requirement of "prior refusal" is still valid in the context of a search of a
residence as in Camara, the Court in See seems to contemplate warrants issued in advance
of the search of businesses in order to preserve the element of surprise. The Court did indicate,
however, that the reasonableness of these advance warrants will vary with the nature of the
regulation involved. Id. at 545 n.6.
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before Camara, which are based on considerations more compelling
than the dictates of sound administration: express consent, emer-
gency, and open fields.23
The three additional exceptions to the warrant requirement that
have been approved by the Court since Camara are: (1) "Effective
enforcement." This exception is said to be necessary because effec-
tive inspection requires a surprise element; (2) "Pervasive regula-
tion." This exception is said to be justified when the particular
industry engaged in by the corporation or individual subject to the
inspection is "pervasively regulated" and therefore the corporation
or individual has from the outset only a limited expectation of pri-
vacy; (3) "Statutory restraints." This exception is said to be applic-
able if a legislative scheme imposes conditions on the exercise of the
inspection power that assumes the "reasonableness" of the search.24
There is some question as to whether these exceptions are inde-
pendent or whether all three must coexist in order for an inspection
to be valid without a search warrant.25 Assuming however that each
operates as an independent exception, it will be shown that each is
an unnecessary exception to the Camara rule both in the context of
EPA enforcement or in any other context .2
23. For a discussion of the "open fields" exception see section III.D. infra. "Emergency"
and "express consent" are outside the scope of the present discussion.
24. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp. v.
United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
In Colonnade, federal agents from the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division of the Internal
Revenue Service visited the catering establishment and without a search warrant or consent
of the manager or owner inspected the cellar. When the owner refused to open a locked room,
the agents broke the lock, entered the room, and removed liquor bottles which they be-
lievied had been refilled in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5301(c). In finding the warrantless in-
spection valid, the Court noted the long history of governmental supervision and inspection
of the liquor industry.
In Biswell, although the Court noted that federal regulation of the firearms industry was
not as deeply rooted in history as is governmental control of the liquor industry...
close scrutiny of this traffic is undeniably of central importance to federal efforts
to prevent violent crimes and to assist the states in regulating the firearms traffic
within their borders. . . large interests are at stake, and inspection is a crucial part
of the regulatory scheme ....
406 U.S. at 315.
25. 29 BAYLOR L. REv. 283, 290 (1977).
26. It may be argued that two other exceptions to the Camara rule were created by the
Court's decisions in Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) and United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). In Wyman the question before the Court was the validity of a
warrantless visit to the home of a welfare recipient. The Court held that the visit did not
constitute a "search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment and that even if it had
been a search, it was "reasonable." See also Administrative Search Warrants, supra note 10,
at 616-17.
In Martinez-Fuerte, the Court held "that [automobile] stops for brief questioning rou-
tinely conducted at permanent checkpoints are consistent with the Fourth Amendment and
need not be authorized by warrant." 428 U.S. at 566. However, the Court specifically stated
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The types of EPA inspections to be examined are: (1) routine
inspections and (2) inspections that are based upon specific evi-
dence of an existing violation. In either case, it is the conclusion of
this article that EPA should be required to obtain a warrant prior
to conducting such an inspection unless the inspection is done pur-
suant to one of the pre-Camara exceptions: consent, "open fields"
or emergency. 7 The fact that criminal liability under some of the
environmental statutes could result from evidence discovered dur-
ing an administrative inspection does not change the conclusion
that only a diluted showing of probable cause should be required.?8
III. THE PosT-Camara EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
A. Effective Enforcement
The desirability and perhaps the necessity of surprise inspections
has been used by the Court to justify warrantless inspections in
some contexts. In United States v. Biswe 11,21 the Court said:
In See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), the mission of the
inspection system was to discover and correct violations of the
building code, conditions that were relatively difficult to conceal
or correct in a short time. . . . Here [in the context of enforcing
in Barlow's, Inc.:
The automobile-search cases cited by the Secretary are even less helpful to his
position than the labor cases. The fact that automobiles occupy a special category
in Fourth Amendment case law is by now beyond doubt due, among other factors,
to the quick mobility of a car, the registration requirements of both the car and the
driver, and the more available opportunity for plain-view observations of a car's
contents.
436 U.S. at 315 n.10.
27. But see 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 283 (1977): "The Environmental Protection Agency's
inspection powers have not yet been subjected to judicial scrutiny, but it would appear that
they would come nearer to meeting the 'pervasive regulation' and 'effective enforcement'
exceptions than would OSHA." Id. at 307.
28. In Camara, the Court recognized that "[like most regulatory laws, fire, health, and
housing codes are enforced by criminal processes. In some cities, discovery of a violation by
the inspector leads to a criminal complaint." 387 U.S. at 531 (footnote omitted). From this
it is clear that the Court in Camara thought the general rules laid down in that case should
apply whether the inspection could uncover criminal or civil violations. One author has
specifically pointed to Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) as making this point clear:
[In Wyman] [t]he Court distinguished Camara and See by noting that in both
cases searches for criminal violations were involved, whereas in Wyman no criminal
sanctions could be imposed; if the beneficiary's consent to the visit was not granted,
aid would simply be denied. The Court thus partially reinstated the civil-criminal
distinction of Frank without overruling Camara by redefining "criminal" to encom-
pass the facts of both the Frank and Camara cases.
Administrative Search Warrants, supra note 10, at 616. Contra, Wyman v. James, 400 U.S.
at 344 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
29. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
1979]
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the Gun Control Act of 1968], if inspection is to be effective and
serve as a credible deterrent, unannounced, even frequent, inspec-
tions are essential. In this context, the prerequisites of a warrant
could easily frustrate inspection; and if the necessary flexibility as
to time, scope, and frequency is to be preserved, the protections
afforded by a warrant would be negligible.3
The Court in Barlow's, Inc. nevertheless has rejected the effective
enforcement rationale. Agreeing that the element of surprise is ad-
vantageous and prevents "speedy alteration or disguise" of viola-
tions, the Court provided the solution by suggesting that "warrants
may be issued ex parte and executed without delay and without
prior notice, thereby preserving the element of surprise .... ."I,
The Court further asserted that such ex parte warrants will not
impose serious burdens upon the administrators of the inspection
system or upon the courts.
This assertion is somewhat difficult to accept and will require
empirical study to determine its accuracy. 3 Since the normal
inspection procedure for EPA requires some advance preparation
and advance decisions concerning which facilities to inspect, the
additional step of obtaining a search warrant does not seem to be a
tremendous burden in light of the constitutional rights involved.
Moreover, there is nothing preventing EPA from obtaining, in one
trip to the courthouse, search warrants for all the facilities sched-
uled to be searched in any given week. Thus, at least for the agency,
the administrative burden may be minimized.
B. Pervasively Regulated Industry
The pervasively regulated exception is based upon the Colonnade
Catering Corp. v. United States33 and Biswell concept of a limited
expectation of privacy for those individuals or corporations engaged
in a heavily or "pervasively regulated" industry.34 This exception is
based upon nothing more than fictional consent and seems only to
serve the purpose of reducing the administrative and judicial bur-
30. Id. at 316.
31. 436 U.S. at 316.
32. It is interesting to note, however, that: "Since the U.S. Supreme Court issued its
decision in Barlow's, Inc. on May 23, only 291 employers of the 19,216 visited by the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration have demanded that inspectors obtain search war-
rants to conduct inspections, according to the agency [OSHA]." 47 U.S.L.W. 2051 (July 25,
1978).
33. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
34. 436 U.S. at 313. The Barlow's, Inc. Court, in recognizing this exception, pointed out
that a person engaging in the types of industries contemplated by the exception has
"voluntarily chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of governmental regulation." Id.
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den of obtaining a Camara-type warrant. But administrative con-
venience cannot justify such "inroads on fourth amendment safe-
guards,"35 and there are further reasons which render this exemption
unjustifiable. The three justifications stated in Camara for requir-
ing an administrative warrant also exist in the context of a perva-
sively regulated industry. Those three reasons are: (1) to inform the
employer that the inspection is authorized by statute; (2) to advise
him of the lawful limits of the inspection; and (3) to assure that the
person demanding entry is an authorized inspector.3" Although an
individual engaged in a pervasively regulated industry may be con-
structively on notice that he is subject to statutorily authorized
inspections, the individual is not necessarily assured that the per-
son demanding entry is an authorized inspector. And there is no
assurance that the particular inspection is not a discriminatory or
harrassment inspection. Such assumptions are not rationally re-
lated to the fact that the industry is highly regulated.
Aside from the question of the validity of this exception, its appli-
cation has been consistently restricted to the liquor and firearms
industries,37 and would appear to be inapplicable in the context of
most EPA regulated industries. EPA, like OSHA, regulates all
kinds of industries. Once again, the test is not whether the industry
is regulated, but whether it is pervasively regulated. Although cer-
tain environmental statutes, the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act (FWPCA) 31 for example, are licensing statutes in the very
broadest sense, 39 such licensing and regulation is distinguishable
from that which was present in Colonnade or in Biswell.41' The scope
of the FWPCA is much more akin to the kind of regulation that
exists under the auspices of OSHA. Both OSHA and EPA regulate
a broad spectrum of different industries pursuant to legislative
35. Brennan v. Gibson's Prod., Inc., 407 F. Supp. 154, 161 (E.D. Tex. 1976).
36. 387 U.S. at 532.
37. The Court in Barlow's, Inc. stated that:
The Secretary [of Labor] urges that an exception from the search warrant re-
quirement has been recognized for "pervasively regulated business[es]" . .. .
These cases are indeed exceptions, but they represent responses to relatively unique
circumstances. Certain industries have such a history of government oversight that
no reasonable expectation of privacy. . . could exist for a proprietor over the stock
of such enterprise. Liquor (Colonnade) and firearms (Biswell) are industries of this
type ....
436 U.S. at 313 (citations omitted).
38. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976) (as amended, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376 (1978)). This
Act is commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act.
39. The licensing provision of the FWPCA provides that no discharge of pollutants from
a point source into navigable waters of the United States is allowed without first obtaining a
permit from EPA or in some cases from a state environmental agency. Id. §§ 1341-1342.
40. But see 29 BAYLOR L. REv. 283, 307 (1977) (written before the Court's decision in
Barlow's. Inc.).
1979]
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mandates. However, these myriad businesses are not necessarily
highly regulated industries which may be said by implication to
consent to warrantless inspections. In that sense, Barlow's, Inc.'s
finding of the non-applicability of this exception in an OSHA con-
text also applies to EPA.4"
Thus, while the Court has left intact the restrictions on the appli-
cation of the pervasively regulated exception, to this date, only the
gun and liquor industries have met the rigorous exemption stan-
dards.
C. Statutory Restraints
The statutory restraints exception was first enunciated by the
Court in Biswell: "Each licensee is annually furnished with a re-
vised compilation of ordinances that describe his obligations and
define the inspector's authority. . . .The dealer is not left to won-
der about the purposes of the inspector or the limits of his task. '42
Although this exception could be justified on the ground that it
places some limitations on the scope of the inspections, it ignores
the discretion left in the hands of the field inspector with regard to
the frequency of inspections at any single establishment.,' This is
one form of discretion that a judicial officer could and should insure
is not abused. As the Court has stated, "[tihe historical judgment,
which the Fourth Amendment accepts, is that unreviewed executive
discretion may yield too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating
evidence and overlook potential invasions of privacy and protected
speech.""
The Court in Barlow's, Inc. recognized this need to restrict the
discretion of field inspectors.
41. In Barlow's, Inc. it was stated that:
Industries such as [firearms and liquor] fall within the "certain carefully defined
classes of cases," referenced in Camara .... The element that distinguishes these
enterprises from ordinary businesses is a long tradition of close government supervi-
sion, of which any person who chooses to enter such a business must already be
aware.
The clear import of our [line of administrative inspection] cases is that the
closely regulated industry of the type involved in Colonnade and Biswel is the
exception. . . .Nor can any but the most fictional sense of voluntary consent to
later searches be found in the single fact that one conducts a business affecting
interstate commerce; under current practice and law, few businesses can be con-
ducted without having some effect on interstate commerce.
436 U.S. at 313-14 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
42. 406 U.S. at 316 (citation omitted).
43. The inspection provision of the statute involved in Biswell may be found at 18 U.S.C.
§ 923(g) (1976).
44. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972) (footnote omit-
ted); accord, See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. at 545.
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The authority to make warrantless searches devolves almost unbri-
dled discretion upon executive and administrative officers, partic-
ularly those in the field, as to when to search and whom to search.
A warrant, by contrast, would provide assurances from a neutral
officer that the inspection is reasonable under the Constitution, is
authorized by statute, and is pursuant to an administrative plan
containing specific neutral criteria. 5
There is no reason to believe that these concerns are or will be
alleviated by a statute restricting the scope of the search. A restric-
tion on the frequency of inspections, however, may serve to prevent
discriminatory or harrassment inspections. Yet, although the var-
ious statutes administered by EPA that provide for administrative
inspections all speak in terms of reasonableness (and some have
more safeguards than others), none limit the frequency of inspec-
tions.'" Moreover, even if the "statutory restraints" exception were
valid outside the context of a pervasively regulated industry such
as existed in Biswell, the limitations on the scope of an EPA inspec-
tion under its various statutes are more analogous to those in the
OSHA statute, which were held insufficient in Barlow's, Inc.
45. 436 U.S. at 323 (footnote omitted). See also Camara, 387 U.S. at 532.
46. The Safe Drinking Water Act provides for "inspection, at reasonable times, of records,
files, papers, processes, controls and facilities, or in order to test any feature of a public water
system including its raw water source." Detailed notice requirements are also imposed. 42
U.S.C. § 300j-4(b) (1976).
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act states that persons handling hazardous
wastes shall allow EPA officers or employees "at all reasonable times to have access to, and
to copy all records relating to such wastes." In addition, the officers or employees may "enter
at reasonable times any establishment or other place maintained by any person where hazard-
ous wastes are generated, stored, treated, or disposed of. . . to inspect and obtain sam-
ples. . . . [ejach such inspection shall be commenced and completed with reasonable
promptness." 42.U.S.C. §§ 6927-29 (1976).
The Toxic Substances Control Act provides for the inspection of "premises in which chemi-
cal substances or mixtures are manufactured, stored, or held before or after their distribution
in commerce . . . .[ejach such inspection shall be commenced and completed with reasona-
ble promptness and shall be conducted at reasonable times, within reasonable limits, and in
a reasonable manner." In order to examine certain types of data, the nature and extent of
the data must be "described with reasonable specificity in. . . written notice." 15 U.S.C. §
2610 (1976).
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act provides in similar terms for inspection at reason-
able times pursuant to reasonable requirements of the Administrator. 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)
(1976) (as amended, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1318(a) (1978)).
Reasonable promptness of commencement and completion of an inspection is similarly
required by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act. 7 U.S.C. § 136g(a) (1976)
(as amended, 7 U.S.C.A. § 136g(a) (West Supp. 1978)).
Finally, the Clean Air Act calls for reasonable requirements with regard to information
which the Administrator may compel, and access to records and emission monitoring devices
may be had at reasonable times. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401 (West Supp. 1977).
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D. The Open Fields Exception
Aside from the emergency and consent exceptions created prior
to Camara, there is one other that could be particularly helpful to
EPA. The open fields exception was first articulated in Hester v.
United States." There federal agents concealed themselves outside
and saw the defendant hand another individual a bottle of spirits.
At the time that the agents saw the defendant, there was a question
about whether the agents were trespassing on land owned by the
defendant's father. "[T]he special protection accorded by the
Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'persons, houses, papers,
and effects,' is not extended to the open fields. The distinction
between the latter and the house is as old as the common law."4
The open fields doctrine was recently reaffirmed in Air Pollution
Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa Corp.' There a state (Colorado)
inspector entered the outdoor premises of Western Alfalfa with nei-
ther a warrant nor the consent of the company to perform some
pollution tests. The Court relying upon the open fields exception
held that there was no constitutional violation. 50 Significantly, how-
ever, the Court seemed to indicate that absent the applicability of
the open fields exception, it would have adhered to Camara and See
in the context of an environmental inspection:
We adhere to Camara and See but we think they are not applicable
here. The field inspector did not enter the plant or offices. . . .He
had sighted what anyone in the city who was near the plant could
see in the sky-plumes of smoke .... The field inspector was on
47. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
48. Id. at 59 (citation omitted).
49. 416 U.S. 861 (1974).
50. Id. at 861. The recently filed Dow Chemical case against EPA referred to in note 7
supra, seems to involve a fact situation where the open fields exception may have some
applicability. However, aerial surveillance would seem to push the exception too far. Al-
though E.I. duPont de Nemours and Co., Inc. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024, rehearing denied, 401 U.S. 967 (1971), involved industrial espio-
nage carried out by means of aerial surveillance, what the court said there would seem to
apply at least in spirit to the Dow Chemical case:
[We] realize that industrial espionage of the sort here perpetrated has become a
popular sport in some segments of our industrial community. However, our devo-
tion to free wheeling industrial competition must not force us into accepting the
law of the jungle as the standard of morality expected in our commercial relations.
431 F.2d at 1016. The important question that has to be faced is what is constitutionally
offensive scrutiny. It would be fallacious to extend the open fields exception to the facts in
Dow because if it were, advanced technology has given us microphones and cameras that can
make an enclosed room an "open field." Spatially based criteria of eligibility for fourth
amendment protection ignore the pertinent question as to what it is we wish to see preserved
from the offensive scrutiny.
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respondent's property but we are not advised that he was on prem-
ises from which the public was excluded."
IV. EFFECT OF WARRANT REQUIREMENT ON EPA ENFORCEMENT
PROGRAM
If, in fact, the Supreme Court does eventually hold that EPA
inspections fall within the general rule enunciated in Camara, See
and Barlow's, Inc. rather than the exceptions noted in Colonnade
and Biswell, what will be the effect on EPA's enforcement program?
There have been claims that such a holding would drastically re-
duce EPA's effectiveness. 2 A close examination of the regulatory
statutes that EPA administers, however, reveals that none of those
statutes contemplate forced entry by EPA. Therefore, the statutes
that EPA administers compel EPA to go to court once entry is
refused, even if the Court were to find EPA inspections distinguish-
able in a fourth amendment sense from OSHA inspections.
The majority in Barlow's, Inc. has already indicated that they
interpret the inspection provision contained in the Clean Air Act 53
not to contemplate forced entry without either judicial or adminis-
trative review.'4 A close examination of the inspection provisions in
the other regulatory statutes that EPA administers, in light of
Barlow's, Inc., reveals that none of these statutes contemplates
forced entry without review.
The FWPCA, like the Clean Air Act, provides that the Adminis-
trator of EPA "shall issue an order . . . or he shall bring a civil
action" whenever he finds that there has been a refusal to allow an
inspection. 5 The FWPCA further provides for criminal penalties, as
does the Clean Air Act, when the refusal to allow the inspection was
willful or negligent." Nevertheless, there is no provision purporting
to allow for forcible entry, even when such an illegal refusal occurs. 57
51. 416 U.S. at 864-65.
52. In an amicus brief filed by the Sierra Club in Barlow's, Inc., it was stated that
"invalidation of warrantless inspections will have a 'devasting effect' on the enforcement of
environmental laws, including the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and Clean Air Act."
The Sierra Club was joined by the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union
as well as by another environmental group, Friends of the Earth. [19771 8 ENmR. REP. (BNA)
427.
53. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7508 (West Pamphlet 1977).
54. 436 U.S. at 321-22.
55. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3)(1976) (as amended, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319 (a)(3)(1978)).
56. Id. § 1319(c)(1).
57. The legislative history of the FWPCA supports the view of the Court in Barlow's, Inc.
that forced entry was not contemplated in the Clean Air Act and further supports the position
that forced entry was also not contemplated in the FWPCA: "As under the Clean Air Act,
the Committee expects that authority to enter will be used judiciously and upon any chal-
lenge to entry the Committee expects the Administrator to obtain the necessary warrant."
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In enforcing the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
(RCRA),18 the Administrator must in fact give notice to the violator
of his failure to comply with any requirement under that Act, in-
cluding the failure to allow an inspection. After waiting thirty days
from the issuance of such notice, the Administrator may commence
a civil action in district court or he may issue an Administrative
Order.5 There are, however, no criminal sanctions imposed for fail-
ure to allow an inspection under RCRA, and once again no provision
for forced entry.
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act" specifi-
cally states that "upon a showing to an officer or court of competent
jurisdiction that there is reason to believe that the provisions of this
subchapter have been violated, officers or employees duly desig-
nated by the Administrator are empowered to obtain and to execute
warrants authorizing . . . entry for the purpose of this sec-
tion . . "' Once again, no provision for forced entry exists in this
Act.
The Toxic Substances Control Act 2 provides for both civil and
criminal penalties for refusing to permit entry or inspection as pro-
vided for in that Act. 3 In light of Barlow's, Inc., as well as the plain
meaning of the Act, it is clear that forced entry is not contemplated.
Finally, the Safe Drinking Water Act"l simply states: "Whoever
fails or refuses to comply with any requirement of subsection (a) of
this section or to allow the Administrator, the Comptroller General,
or representatives of either, to enter and conduct any audit or
inspection authorized by subsection (b) of this section may be fined
not more than $5,000."6 Obviously, no forced entry is contemplated
here.
Since forced entry is not possible whenever EPA is refused entry,
a decision such as Barlow's, Inc. in the context of EPA, would have
little or no effect on EPA's enforcement program. As the statutes
discussed above indicate, the administrative burden of obtaining a
warrant after entry is refused already exists.
S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., lot Sess. 62 (1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWs 3668, 3729.
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1976).
59. Id. § 6928(a).
60. 7 U.S.C. § 136g(a) (1976) (as amended, 7 U.S.C.A. § 136g(a) (West Supp. 1978)).
61. Id. § 136g(b).
62. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-29 (1976).
63. Id. §§ 2614-16.
64. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-9 (1976) (as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300f-300j-10 (West
Supp. 1978)).
65. Id. § 300j-4(c).
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V. CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court in Barlow's, Inc. did limit its deci-
sion to the "facts and law concerned with OSHA,"" one cannot
ignore the fact that in dicta the Court indicated that where a regula-
tory statute already contemplates "resort to federal-court enforce-
ment when entry is refused," 7 the Court would not be inclined to
allow warrantless inspections. Moreover, in the one environmental
inspection case that has reached the Court, Western Alfalfa, the
Court again in dicta indicated that but for the open fields exception,
they would have followed the general rule of Camara and See." All
this, coupled with the apparent inapplicability of the three excep-
tions enunciated in Colonnade and Biswell, leads to the conclusion
that EPA must obtain a search warrant, albeit with the diluted
probable cause requirement specified in Camara, before conducting
administrative inspections. This conclusion, however, would not
have a detrimental effect on EPA's enforcement program because
the statutes that authorize EPA to conduct inspections do not con-
template forced entry in any event.
66. 436 U.S. at 322.
67. Id. at 321.
68. 416 U.S. at 864-65.
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